Tariff discrimination on Brazil's soluble coffee: an economic analysis by NISHIJIMA, Marislei & SAES, Maria Sylvia Macchione
Revista de Economia Política  30 (2), 2010 293
tariff discrimination on Brazil’s  
soluble coffee: an economic analysis
MarisLei nishiJiMa* 
Maria syLvia Macchione saes**
This article evaluates the impacts of the imposition of tariffs on the Brazilian 
soluble coffee mainly by European countries as of the 1990s. More particularly, 
it verifies whether the imposition of discriminatory trade tariffs by the European 
Union and of non-discriminatory ones by some Eastern European countries reflects 
on the international demand for this commodity. For this purpose, dynamic models 
of global demand for Brazilian soluble coffee were estimated for the 1995-2003 
period using data from the International Coffee Organization. Findings suggest that 
existing tariffs significantly account for the reduction of Brazilian share of soluble 
in the world market. 
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Though Brazil leads the world in soluble coffee production and exports1, its 
share in the global market has decreased since 1993: from 31% in 1992 to 15%2 
of that market as of 1998. What accounted for the country’s relative loss of market 
share was the limited growth of its domestic market in comparison to that of the 
world market. The increase in soluble coffee world exports found its supply main-
ly in traditionally consuming and non-producing countries. Singapore expanded 
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1  Saes (1997).
2  Market size measured in 60 kg bags of green coffee (conversion: net weight *1000*2,6/60), as per 
the International Coffee Organization (ICO).
Brazilian Journal of political Economy, vol  30, nº 2 (118), pp  293-309 April-June/2010
Revista de Economia Política  30 (2), 2010294
its world market share from 5% to 10%; Malaysia started exporting to 7% of the 
global market; Spain and the Following the increase in soluble coffee exports world-
wide, there was a decrease in prices paid to Brazilian exporters in the interna-
tional market as result of increased competition. Brazilian soluble coffee exports 
have been a target for both discriminatory tariffs mainly by European countries, 
and for non-discriminatory ones by some Eastern European countries. Thus this 
study aims to verify whether those tariffs can account for the relative loss this com-
modity suffered in the world market3 and to discuss the fall in the welfare caused 
by discriminatory ones.
For this purpose, the article is divided into five parts, including this Introduction: 
the first part presents a brief overview of the participation of the Brazilian instant 
coffee in the international market as of the 1990s. The second part discusses the 
tariff restrictions on trade faced by the Brazilian soluble coffee. The third part 
discusses the economic effects on welfare of using tariffs relative to free trade for 
a producing country with no comparative advantage for a specific commodity. The 
fourth part presents the estimated models to evaluate the effects of the tariffs on 
the Brazilian soluble coffee demand. Finally, the main conclusions of the study are 
summarized in last part.
THE BRAZILIAN SOLUBLE COFFEE INDUSTRy
We supposed that Brazil — despite its relative loss in the world market — has 
comparative advantage in producing soluble coffee insofar as it is the world’s larg-
est producer and exporter of the arabica green coffee and one of the largest export-
ers of the robusta green coffee, the main input of soluble coffee. 
The Brazilian soluble coffee industry4 was implemented in the 1960s through 
government incentives aimed at reducing the high costs of the low quality green 
coffee stocks to meet external demand. In the early 1990s, however, Brazil started 
to reduce its relative participation in the world market of soluble coffee, as seen in 
Table 1. Colombia and Ecuador, both traditional producers of soluble coffee, also 
lost relative market shares. Non-traditional producers started to take on leading 
positions, mainly Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia, which increased 
their relative share by 5% and 6%, respectively, through 1995-2003. Developed 
countries also increased their share in the same period: Spain by 3%; the Netherlands 
by 3%; the US by 2%; and Germany by 2%. Nevertheless, despite those changes 
in relative market positions in the world market of soluble coffee, few countries 
3  For the Brazilian soluble coffee industry, the world market is what matters. Though domestic con-
sumption has grown and gained importance in the last few years, a full 87 % of the soluble produced 
in the country is exported (ABICS, 2005).
4  For a detailed history of the origins of soluble coffee industry see Talbot (1997).
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reduced their export quantity; on the contrary, world exports increased by 94% 
between 1995 and 2002. 
Countries that did not use to produce green coffee were able to garner a 
larger share of the soluble coffee market either by benefiting from the great avail-
ability of the raw material at low prices in the international market or by packing 
soluble coffee purchased in bulk quantities. Overall world exports of green coffee 
over 1995-2004 presented a cumulative 20% increase, according to International 
Coffee Organization (ICO). Brazil and Vietnam were the main countries respon-
sible for this growth: the former captured 29% of the world market in 2004 against 
the 21% held in 1995; and the latter 16% of this market in 2004, up from a mere 
5% in 1995. 
Green coffee beans of robusta coffee – the relevant type in the world manu-
facture of soluble coffee — have lower prices than the arabica beans in the inter-
national market, besides giving a better yield5. Vietnam largely accounted for the 
increased supply of the main input of soluble coffee in the international market, 
producing the robusta coffee nearly exclusively. This country increased its produc-
tion by 10 millions bags between 1995 and 2004, being the largest world exporter 
of this variety, accounting for 43% of the world market in 2001. The large increase 
in Vietnam’s production capacity was driven by a World Bank incentive program 
for poor countries (the Poverty and Growth Program of the World Bank Institute). 
Brazil’s product shared the fourth place with the Ugandan robusta coffee in the 
same year in the ranking of world exporters.
The huge increase in the quantity of negotiated green coffee in the world mar-
ket resulted in a steady decrease in its international price. Graph 1 shows the price 
behavior in dollars of the robusta coffee per ton. The production cost of soluble 
coffee has dramatically decreased in the last few years, which in part explains the 
recent drop in soluble coffee prices in the international market. 
As the international prices of green coffee decreased, so did the international 
price of the soluble coffee exported by Brazil, but at a higher rate. This suggests a 
reduction in the profit margins made by Brazilian producers of soluble coffee and 
increased competition in the world market of soluble coffee. 
5 It allows for an estimated rate of extraction of soluble solids of 40% against 35% to 37% of the 
arabica species.
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Graph 1: Prices in US$ per ton of Brazilian  
soluble coffee and Robusta green coffee
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Source: International Coffee Organization (2005).
TARIFF PROBLEMS FACED By BRAZILIAN SOLUBLE COFFEE 
The European Union (EU) tariff discrimination system toward Brazilian solu-
ble coffee was started in 1991, within the framework of the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) scheme effective in 1990. The GSP granted customs exemptions 
for some Latin American countries – including Colombia — as part of the opera-
tional cooperation against drug trafficking, characterized as Drug Regime (DR). 
But the GSP maintained a rate of taxation of 9% on imports of Brazilian soluble 
coffee and of 8.5% on Mexico’s and India’s. In 1996, the EU reassessed the GSP 
and set forth a new mechanism for a decrease in or exemption from duties accord-
ing to the degree of economic development of the countries. Being considered as a 
developed country, as of January 1997 Brazil had a 10.1% import tariff imposed 
by the EU, as seen in Table 2. Andean Pact countries, though, continued to enjoy 
the exemption.
After the approval of the 1990 discriminatory policy, the Brazilian Association 
of the Soluble Coffee Industry (ABICS) had started several actions to reverse the 
EU’s position6. But despite the fact that NERA7 analysis pointing out several eco-
6 In March 1997, lawyers hired by the association concluded that there were legal bases for the claim 
(Malta, 2004).
7  National Economic Research Associates, Inc; White Plains, Ny.
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nomic arguments able to sustain a claim together with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), Brazil did not manage to reverse its position. In May 2001, after several 
negotiations — including those occurring after the case had been taken to the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) — the Europeans established a quota system 
for Brazil, under the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause8. Still, according to this 
system, quantities negotiated above the quota would continue to face the tariff of 
9% (OJEC, 2001). 
Brazil had unsuccessfully pointed out in the above-mentioned negotiations the 
need to adjust the volume of quotas in case the EU decided to admit new member-
countries. After May 2004, ten new countries, significant importers of Brazilian 
soluble coffee, became members of the EU thereby creating an impasse. At the end 
the EU (including its new members) took out the quota system and set a tariff of 
9% for Brazilian coffee. With respect to the Mercosul-EU negotiations then under 
way, the Brazilian industry proposed either to include soluble coffee in Category 
A9, thus eliminating the quota system and making all Brazilian exports of soluble 
coffee duty free; or, alternatively, to include this product in Category B10, thus in-
creasing Brazilian soluble coffee import quota. 
Table 3 summarizes the history of soluble coffee imports made by the EU after 
1990 per country of origin. Whereas the overall imports of soluble coffee by the 
EU almost doubled from 1990 to 2003, total imports of soluble coffee from Brazil 
decreased along the 1990s, from 20.5% in 1993 to 6.2% in 1999, growing again 
only after 2002, when the quota regime was enforced. 
The Brazilian industry of soluble coffee was also hampered in the 1990s by 
the cut in Soviet imports in 1991. Both the return of Russia to the market in 1993 
and the recovery of coffee prices in the world market favored Brazil’s soluble coffee 
exports as compared with previous years (Zylbersztajn et al., 1993). Nevertheless, 
Brazilian soluble coffee exports to Russia — which in the early 1990s had been 
Brazil’s main buyer — decreased dramatically as of 1993. Russia, as well as Ukraine 
— another great importer of Brazilian soluble coffee — adopted policies of high 
import tariffs to foster their domestic production. According to the ICO, the current 
tariff for importing soluble coffee into the Russian Federation is 15% and into 
Ukraine is 30%. Other countries in the European East also have high import tariffs 
for soluble coffee, among them Hungary (35%), Bulgaria (25%) and Romania 
8 The Most Favored Nation clause establishes that any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity grant-
ed by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territo-
ries of all other contracting parties.
9 Category A includes products whose tariff would be immediately cut in the Mercosur-EU agree-
ment.
10 Inclusion in this category would increase the Brazilian soluble coffee imports quota, through the in-
troduction of a percentage rate taking into account the Brazilian position in the expanded European 
market.
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(19%). This policy of fostering domestic production implies that Brazil tends to 
lose those markets definitely (Saes & Nakazone, 2003). 
In addition to the EU and Eastern European countries, other countries impose 
discriminatory tariffs on Brazilian soluble coffee. For instance, China levied a tar-
iff of 44%, reduced to 30% after it joined the WCO, and Mexico levies a 141% 
tariff (Malta, 2004). 
Although the US does not levy a tax on Brazilian soluble coffee, the decade 
witnessed campaigns to reduce the consumption of coffee in general, which caused 
the consumption of this good to drop from approximately 0.46 cups daily in the 
1980s to 0.18 cups daily between 1990 and 2004 (USDA11, 2005). Nevertheless, 
in 2003 the US was the biggest buyer of Brazilian soluble coffee, as seen in Table 
3, having almost single-handedly bought soluble coffee in bulk. Even though the 
US has production plants for soluble coffee installed, Brazil sells this good in bulk 
at prices lower than those at which the North-Americans can produce, so it is more 
advantageous for the latter to buy from Brazil, and package and sell the product 
in its market (Malta, 2004). This behavior signals that Brazil has indeed been hav-
ing comparative advantage12 in producing this good, although it also suggests that 
the US demand is very price elastic, insofar as this country is capable of producing 
soluble coffee domestically should the price of this Brazilian commodity grow ex-
cessively. 
It is worth noting that despite the discriminatory import tariffs, Germany’s 
volume of imports from Brazil increase, as seen in Table 4. One such reason may 
be this country imports soluble coffee in bulk from Brazil, like the US, and re-ex-
ports the produce packaged and labeled, mainly to the EU13. 
THE INEFFICIENCy OF DISCRIMINATORy  
AND NON-DISCRIMINATORy TARIFFS 
According to Rieber (1981), different tariff levies on a commodity can induce 
a country which has a single producer14 (monopoly) since to protect its incipient 
industry until to become internationally competitive, even without having a com-
parative advantage in exporting this commodity. However, these possibilities may 
11  United  States Department of Agriculture, site accessed in November, <http://www.usda.gov/wps/por-
tal/usdahome>. 
12  This has been happening even though there is no drawback mechanism for green coffee in Brazil, as 
in Colombia.  
13 Germany also acts likewise with Brazilian green coffee, buying a homogeneous produce and foster-
ing its differentiation through the marketing of its own brands. 
14 Note that if the domestic market of a good is perfectly competitive, the tariff cannot reverse the trade 
flows. 
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imply loss of welfare in relation to a situation of free trade, as traditional interna-
tional economic literature points out. This model is adequate to analyses, for in-
stance, the Russia case, since it imposes tariffs on the soluble coffee from all origins 
to foster its domestic industry growth and because the costs for implementing 
soluble coffee facilities are very high (Saes, 1997). We assumed the world soluble 
coffee market to be competitive, even though Brazil is a large supplier, because of 
the many newcomers in the last decade and the dramatic fall in the commodity’s 
international price, as seen above. 
Panel A in Figure 1 depicts the economic analysis of Rieber (1981). If there are 
free trade flows, the equilibrium occurs in the b point. If the country tariffs by t1 
rate, the domestic price will be (1 + t1)Pw —, being Pw the international competitive 
price of the commodity — the domestic firm sells 0q3 units and the country imports 
q3q5 and loses M area of welfare compared with free trade. If the tariff rate is t2, 
this commodity is no longer traded internationally, i.e., all domestic demand is 
satisfied by domestic firms. The equilibrium is 0q4 units at the price (1 + t2)Pw and 
the loss of welfare is the sum of the G, L and M areas. As for tariffs higher than t2, 
the domestic producer behaves as a monopolist. Also, for tariff rates between t2 
and t3, the domestic producer charges the international price plus tariffs. If t3 is the 
charged tariff rate, the domestic producer comes back to its initial position selling 
the same quantity as in free trade; however, the deadweight loss corresponds to the 
sum of C, F, G, E, I, J, K, L, M areas. Additionally, the marginal cost of the domes-
tic producer at this rate is equal to Pw, but its marginal revenue is lower than that. 
Thus, for a tariff rate higher than t3, producers start discriminating prices, selling 
part of their production in the international market at Pw and part in domestic 
market at a higher price. Finally, at a tariff equal to or above t4, it is more rational 
for domestic producers to export their production to the international market at 
Pw than to sell it domestically, even though there is not comparative advantage in 
producing the commodity. Thus, the higher is the tariff rate the higher is the dead-
weight loss in relation to free trade.
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Figure 1: Non-discriminatory and discriminatory tariff welfare effects 
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Panel b shows the welfare effects of a discriminatory tariff imposed by a coun-
try that has a single producer, such as the case of UE tariffs on Brazilian soluble 
coffee imports. In such a case, a country sets a positive import tariff rate only on a 
specific producing country, so that it continues to engage in free trade with all re-
maining countries. Two possibilities exist here: if the world supply of soluble coffee 
continues to be infinitely elastic in the absence of the discriminated exporting coun-
try, there is no change in the welfare of the producing country that discriminates, 
so the equilibrium shall be b point before and after the discriminatory tariff takes 
place. However, if the exclusion of the discriminated country’s supply affects the 
world supply of the commodity, the curve will shift to a positive sloped world sup-
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ply, the new equilibrium will be attained at the g point, and the discriminatory 
country will incur in a deadweight loss of the Z plus y areas. 
Although Brazil still remains with 15% of the soluble coffee world market, the 
country operates in a competitive way. Thus it is reasonable to believe that the 
elimination of its supply volume from the remaining global supply will signifi-
cantly affect the latter. So, we supposed that discriminatory tariffs by UE countries 
on Brazilian soluble coffee cause inefficiencies in all of these countries, as depicted 
by panel b. Considering the deadweight loss Z and y, we conclude, after the dis-
criminatory tariffs been applied, that the discriminating country will consume less 
and pay more for each unity of the commodity than if this discrimination was not 
done.
THE ESTIMATION OF DEMAND FOR BRAZILIAN SOLUBLE COFFEE
We used data from the following bodies: ABICS, Brazilian Central Bank, IFS-
IMF, Brazilian Foreign Trade Ministry and ICO. The panel data set includes all 
countries15 which imported all types of Brazilian soluble coffee from 1995 until 
2003. To get the estimates we used STATA software. 
To verify whether discriminatory tariffs affect the demand for Brazilian soluble 
coffee, we estimated the foreign demand for Brazilian soluble coffee. We estimated 
linear fixed-effects models (FEM) in two stages using the generalized least square 
(GLS) estimator, along with dynamic models using the generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
To evaluate the effects of customs tariffs on the Brazilian soluble coffee de-
mand we utilized a variable which describes whether a buying country has or has 
not applied a tariff on the Brazilian good over time. We estimated two distinct 
specifications: one for tariffs evaluated by a dummy variable and the other for those 
evaluated by the percentage value of tariffs charged in each country. We supposed 
that the tariffs are exogenous and affect only the demand of soluble coffee. 
Fixed-effects Model (FeM) estimates
The use of the FEM allows the control of specific differences among countries 
in order to consistently estimate the parameters of concern (Islam, 1995). The es-
timated model is described in (1). y is the vector of soluble coffee quantities im-
ported by each country i in each year t ; E y c c y c u
Cov u
it it i it
it it
/ , ,
,
x x x
x
( ) = + + = + +
(
b b b0
) = 0
 is the matrix of the observable explana-
tory random variables, supposed to be linearly independent, which includes: the 
price in dollars of soluble coffee, pi; each country’s GDP per year as a proxy of ag-
gregate income, Rit; the percentage alue of soluble coffee import tariffs in each 
15  According to these data, 130 countries compose the sample.
Revista de Economia Política  30 (2), 2010302
country in each period, fit, in one specification of the model and a dummy variable 
in other (1 for the existence of tariffs and 0 for their absence); each country’s basic 
interest rate by year, jit; Singapore’s and Malaysia’s overall soluble coffee exports 
in each year – countries with the highest relative share of growth in the world 
market16, xmst. c is the matrix of the unobservable constant variable. 
      E y c c y c u
Cov u
it it i it
it it
/ , ,
,
x x x
x
( ) = + + = + +
(
b b b0
) = 0
(1)
One additional problem in estimating (1) lies in the identification of the mod-
el variables: the estimation of the demand function based on data from the market 
does not allow for a defined separation between demand and supply information. 
This causes endogeneity problems in the estimates of the demand model, thereby 
violating the basic hypothesis 
E y c c y c u
Cov u
it it i it
it it
/ , ,
,
x x x
x
( ) = + + = + +
(
b b b0
) = 0 , which ensures model efficiency in 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates. To identify the demand function we used 
the method of instrumental variables, even though we recognize that it is quite 
difficult to find an adequate instrument for the identification (Bond et al., 1995). 
Additionally, in order to avoid this problem, we estimated the dynamic models of 
demand proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
We used the price of the robusta green coffee paid to Brazilian producers17, pit, 
and the Brazilian real exchange rate in relation to the dollar, tct, as instruments for 
the soluble coffee price. The models estimates are shown in Table 5. The first two 
columns show the model with tariffs as percentages, and the two last ones show 
the model with dummy variables of tariffs. The F test18 rejects the null hypothesis 
for both models estimated, suggesting that there are specific relevant differences 
among the buyers of Brazilian soluble coffee. 
Although Hausman’s specification tests were favorable for the REM19, we 
chose the FEM because we considered that the income variable, introduced as a 
control in the model, is correlated with each country’s specific characteristics. For 
instance, the habit and the taste of consuming coffee in its soluble form – an unob-
servable fixed effect in each country since soluble coffee is not an essential good – 
must be related with the country’s income (Baltagi, 2003; Wooldridge, 1997). 
All variables in both models proved statistically significant at 1%, except for 
the tariff dummy variable in the second model, which presented a p-value equal to 
0.100. This result suggests that the existence or non-existence of discriminatory 
tariffs does not affect the Brazilian soluble coffee demand; however, when the 
16 Note that although this variable varies just in t, the matrix x applies this not only to case, but also 
when there are variables varying in i, but constant in t.
17  Note that this variable only varies in t because all countries i that buy soluble coffee from Brazil in 
each time span have the same production cost for this good. 
18  It tests the whole significance of the fixed effect of the countries.
19  Random Effect Model: the results of the tests presented p-values of 0.0751 and 0.3280, respectively, 
for the Qui-square distribution.
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magnitude of the tariffs is considered, they proved to be significant to explain the 
quantity of soluble coffee demanded by the countries.
The coefficient associated with the exports from the Malaysia and Singapore 
variable, xmst, presented a negative sign, suggesting a substitution between the 
coffee sold by Brazil and that sold by other countries, which means that Brazil failed 
to export on account of competition. Those were the countries that most increased 
their participation in the soluble coffee world market over 1995-2003, as seen in 
Table 2, even though they do not produce green coffee. 
The coefficient associated with the price variable presented a negative sign, as 
expected, for a demand function. Income, evaluated through each country’s GDP, 
also presented an expected positive sign, showing that the higher the income, the 
higher the demand for soluble coffee. The interest rate variable and its lag pre-
sented, respectively, a negative and positive sign, showing that the higher the pres-
ent interest rate, the smaller the demand, and that the higher the past interest rate, 
the higher is the demanded quantity. This result suggests that if the interest rate is 
high today, it is better to reduce consumption and that if it was high in the past, it 
is expected to drop in the present, thus increasing incentive for consumption. 
the arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Model 
The FEM estimates are is not efficient for the small period T, and for the mod-
els estimated in the last section it is possible to consider that the use of the lagged 
interest rate as an explicative variable may cause some endogeneity in the model. 
Thus, in order to improve our estimates we estimated dynamic models of demand 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Their idea of a dynamic panel data model 
consists in using lagged variables of both the explained and the explicative vari-
ables, in the more general case, as instruments. The estimated dynamic model 
consists of the first difference of equation (2), which removes c
i and is based on the 
orthogonal conditions between the lagged values of yit and eit. 
y y c uit j i t j it
j
n
it i it
j
= + + + +−
=
∑α b b
α b b
,
x w
x
1
1
2
1 2 it it i c it uc uw σ σ2 2
(2)y y c uit j i t j itj
n
it i it
j
= + + + +−
=
∑α b b
α b b
,
x w
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1
1
2
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j
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it i it
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1
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1 2 it it i c it ucw σ σ2 2 are vectors of parameters to be estimated; 
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j
n
it i it
j
= + + + +−
=
∑α b b
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,
x w
x
1
1
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1 2 it it i c it uc uw σ σ2 2 and 
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j
n
it i it
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=
∑α b b
α b b
,
x w
x
1
1
2
1 2 it t i c it uc uw σ σ2 2 are, respec-
tively, the values of the exogenous variables and the predetermined variables; ci is 
the independent random effect, identically distributed (i.i.d.) in relation to the de-
manding countries and with a constant 
y y c uit j i t j it
j
n
it i it
j
= + + + +−
=
∑α b b
α b b
,
x w
x
1
1
2
1 2 it it i c it uc uw σ σ2 2variance. Finally, uit is i.i.d. over the 
overall sample, which has a constant variance equal to 
y y c uit j i t j it
j
n
it i it
j
= + + + +−
=
∑α b b
α b b
,
x w
x
1
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2
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Table 6 shows the Arellano-Bond dynamic model estimated by the GLS tech-
nique. Model (A) shows one-step estimates of the dynamic model for the panel of 
countries that bought Brazilian soluble coffee, under the hypothesis of homoske-
dasticity. Model (B) corresponds to model (A) corrected by heteroskedasticity of 
the residues. Model (C) is the Arellano-Bond’s two-step estimate. All the models, 
estimated by the first difference, suggest that positive variations in the percentage 
values of discriminatory tariffs negatively affect the demanded quantity of Brazilian 
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soluble coffee. Also, the variable that measures the first difference of Malaysia’s 
and Singapore’s exports has proven statistically significant with a negative sign in 
the three specifications, suggesting the substitution between the products exported 
by those countries and Brazil’s. The signals of the estimates support the last section’s 
results, though the values of the coefficients are not directly comparable because 
while the FEM is estimated by level, GLS models are estimated by differences. 
Model (A) rejects the restrictions of Sargan’s test of the over-identifying restric-
tions, but that may have occurred due to problems of heteroskedasticity. In (C), 
however, neither the null hypotheses of constraints are valid, nor the hypotheses of 
first and second order correlation are rejected, suggesting an improvement in the 
efficiency of the estimated model. Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend the use 
of one-step estimates for the inference because two-step estimates of the standard 
errors tend to be biased down in small samples, which makes coefficients more 
significant, as can be verified in (C). Nevertheless, as the results of the model are 
quite similar and the inference that interests us is the same based on any model, 
this issue becomes irrelevant to our results.
Besides the models discussed in this article, which do not discriminate among 
the different types of soluble coffee, we sought20 to estimate models of demand for 
Brazilian soluble coffee considering the different types of soluble coffee21. The FEMs 
calculated have not generated adequate estimates because we used the same instru-
ments for the different types of soluble coffee. Preliminary estimates of dynamic 
demands by GLS for each type of soluble coffee, an exercise that still requires a 
search for better specifications and that is not the object of this article, suggest a 
few interesting preliminary results, among which is that the demand for soluble 
coffee in bulk seems not to be affected by discriminatory tariffs22. 
CONCLUSIONS
The results of the estimated models suggest that discriminatory and non-dis-
criminatory tariffs had a negative impact on the world demand for Brazilian solu-
ble coffee during the period examined. This may imply that Brazil’s relative loss of 
market is partly associated with the imposition of discriminatory tariffs by the EU 
and by import substitution tariffs adopted by some Eastern European countries. 
20 We have additionally estimated the dynamic models (A), (B) and (C) with the tariffs dummies. These 
have shown the same pattern of result as the FEM: not statistically significant, but near the acceptance 
limit of the null hypothesis. Also, we have estimated versions of the dynamic models of demand con-
sidering some variables to be predetermined, but the statistical results did not differ from those ob-
tained in Table 5.
21  Data for exports of soluble coffee obtained allow discrimination among buyers of each type of sol-
uble coffee.  
22  This may obviously be a problem generated by a bad specification of the model, but the results find 
support in the market analysis.
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Additionally, results suggest that Malaysia and Singapore — the two countries that 
most increased their relative share in the world market in the last years — signifi-
cantly affected the demand for Brazilian soluble coffee. This fact configures those 
countries as substitute suppliers of the Brazilian good, even though neither of them 
produces green coffee, the main input of soluble coffee. 
Considering the size of the Brazilian soluble coffee production capacity, the 
imposition of discriminatory and non-discriminatory tariffs apparently opened 
profitable possibilities for new entrants, including countries that are not tradi-
tional producers of coffee grain input, in particular some Asian and European 
countries. Thus, the imposition of tariffs on the largest exporter of soluble coffee, 
added to the growth of the world soluble coffee market, resulted in new producers 
and exporters in the market, even though they are not efficient and do not have 
comparative advantage. 
Although Brazil is the biggest producer in the world, it does not exercise mar-
ket power in the soluble coffee trade. Nevertheless, the imposition of tariffs by 
countries without comparative advantage results in economic inefficiencies. In 
terms of strategy, some possibilities exist for Brazil to address the problem of loss 
of welfare: a) to toughen its position at the WTO demanding the fall of discrimina-
tory pricing restrictions and of tariff barriers in general; b)to demand or to make 
an impact evaluation of the anti-drug policy (the Drug Regime), in which case the 
strategy would be collective and involve national governments; c) the opening of 
firms abroad, in Europe and Asia, seeking to take advantage of special fares and 
lower costs of workforce, respectively. Whereas this last strategy is mainly private 
— within the firms –, the former ones involve both government and society.
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Table 1: World soluble coffee exports (thousand bags) – percentage per exporting countryw
period 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 change
total percentaGe 
exported by country
 (thousand bags )
8744 9783 11023 10891 11424 13635 15842 16935 94%
total exported 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Producing countries 52% 46% 43% 39% 37% 34% 34% 32% -20%
Brazil 29% 26% 22% 15% 17% 15% 16% 15% -14%
Colômbia 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 4% 4% 4% -2%
Ecuador 5% 3% 3% 4% 3% 2% 2% 2% -3%
México 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% -1%
Índia 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 0%
Indonésia 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%
Ivory Coast 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 0%
consuming countries 48% 54% 57% 61% 63% 66% 66% 68% 20%
US 3% 6% 7% 5% 6% 6% 5% 5% 2%
Canadá 3% 3% 3% 6% 4% 3% 2% 2% -1%
France 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 0%
Germany 9% 10% 9% 10% 10% 11% 10% 11% 2%
Holland 3% 3% 2% 6% 7% 6% 6% 6% 3%
Spain 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 5% 5% 3%
UK 6% 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% -2%
Switzerland 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 0%
Singapore 5% 6% 7% 7% 7% 0% 9% 10% 5%
Malaysia 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 5% 7% 7% 6%
China (and Hong Kong) 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0%
Source: International Coffee Organization (2005).
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Table 2: Tariffs applicable to Brazilian soluble coffee in the EU
Year tariff
1991 to 31.12.96 9,0%
01.01 97 to 30.06.97 10,1%
01.07.97 to 31.12.97 9,1%
01.01.98 to 30.06.98 9,1%
01.07.98 to 31.12.98 8,0%
01.01.99 to 31.12.99 10,5%
01.01.2000 onwards 9,0%
                              Source: MALTA (2004).
Table 3: EU: soluble coffee imports per origin (equivalent to a thousand 60 kg bags)
 1970 1980 1990 1993 1995 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003
total 1206,1 2135,1 2329,9 2281,5 2563,5 3626,5 3483,4 3878,6 4405,0 4610,6
Brazil 377,3 869,0 359,1 468,1 270,4 262,1 215,1 261,6 355,1 401,3
Colombia 0,6 18,7 179,3 140,9 190,5 238,6 204,6 243,1 167,8 154,8
Costa Rica – – – – 6,1 1,1 0,6 1,7 1,5
Ecuador 0,0 49,1 86,7 99,7 119,9 219,4 173,8 159,0 193,3 195,3
Índia 0,0 0,0 3,5 23,9 4,7 12,2 6,6 15,0 14,6 14,3
Indonesia – – – – – 10,2 6,6 22,4 12,3 6,0
México 0,0 11,5 0,0 9,4 46,6 4,0 4,4 1,8 1,6 1,4
Nicaragua – – – – 9,6 13,3 12,4 17,9 5,6
Ivory Coast 19,2 71,5 195,2 – – 292,2 295,1 267,2 291,8 196,2
Tanzânia – – – – – 5,5 4,1 5,4 2,9 4,1
Thailand – – – – – 4,6 4,3 2,1 0,5 0,4
Venezuela – – – – – 5,4 14,8 21,7 26,1 22,8
E.U. 604,9 959,4 1389,9 1692,3 2167,8 2337,3 2338,9 2648,9 3017,8 3324,8
Brazil/EU 31,3% 40,7% 15,4% 20,5% 10,5% 7,2% 6,2% 6,7% 8,1% 8,7%
EU/ 50,2% 44,9% 59,7% 74,2% 84,6% 64,5% 67,1% 68,3% 68,5% 72,1%
Source: International Coffee Organization (2005).
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Table 4: Major Brazilian soluble coffee markets (equivalent to thousand 60 kg bags)
country/Year 1995 1997 1998 2000 2003
var.  
1997/ 1995
Var.  
1998/ 1995
var.  
2000/ 1995
var.  
2003/ 1995
Rússia 1102,7 737,9 393,2 315,0 359,0 -33% -64% -71% -67%
US 425,4 299,8 307,7 480,2 546,2 -30% -28% 13% 28%
Japan 207,5 246,4 214,2 260,8 301,9 19% 3% 26% 45%
Germany 157,1 129,0 188,2 226,7 286,0 -18% 20% 44% 82%
România 155,6 77,9 55,7 25,5 24,2 -50% -64% -84% -84%
UK 122,4 71,5 23,9 6,6 109,8 -42% -80% -95% -10%
Canadá 58,0 38,1 37,6 26,1 22,4 -34% -35% -55% -61%
Finland 42,7 1,7 4,5 34,7 31,5 -96% -89% -19% -26%
Austrália 38,1 50,9 55,8 34,4 21,2 34% 46% -10% -44%
Poland 36,8 57,7 26,5 6,8 20,2 57% -28% -82% -45%
México 34,8 40,9 21,2 14,8 21,1 18% -39% -57% -39%
Singapore 32,1 50,7 35,4 62,7 99,1 58% 10% 95% 209%
Argentina 25,5 33,9 31,9 45,9 112,1 33% 25% 80% 340%
Ukraine 13,0 330,2 74,9 307,6 317,0 2440% 476% 2266% 2338%
Spain 5,6 1,2 1,2 1,3 31,1 -79% -79% -77% 455%
Uruguay 3,7 6,6 8,0 8,2 26,9 78% 116% 122% 627%
Czech Rep. 1,9 2,0 28,0 73,6 77,8 5% 1374% 3774% 3995%
Malaysia 1,2 2,3 0,6 18,3 70,0 92% -50% 1425% 5733%
Lithuania 1,1 7,4 6,0 1,1 57,4 573% 445% 0% 5118%
China 0,8 0,6 1,3 2,6 6,6 -25% 63% 225% 725%
El Salvador – – – – 34,7 – 
Korea DPR – 2,9 1,6 2,7 19,6 –
Others 148,7 144,7 144,6 110,6 252,1 -3% -3% -26% 70%
total 2615 2334 1662 2066 2848 -11% -36% -21% 9%
Source: CECAFÉ (2005).
Table 5: FEM-IV estimates of the Brazilian soluble coffee demand
explained variable
qit
model with percentage tariff model with tariff in binary form
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error 
pit -35.39995*** 8.424229 -35.77469***  8.511825    
fit -3.725526*** 1.535462 -40.99827*   25.42196    
Rit 0.0000702** 0.0000309 0.0000719**   0.0000311     
xmst -0.0267248***   0.0098739    -0.0263614***    0.010044    
jit -1.751061***   0.6478176    -1.818003***   0.6528098    
ji(t-1) 4.579189***   0.0098739    4.580427***   0.5046107     
it continues in the page to the side
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Constant 299.4314***   61.70793     287.9982***   62.88322     
F  test that all  
u_i=0, (Prob>F)  
19.18 (0.0000) *** 18.08 (0.0000) 
Wald chi2(6) 636.20*** 620.89***
Number of obs. 351 351
Instrument pit  e tct pit  e tct
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Table 6: GMM estimates of the world demand for Brazilian soluble coffee
equations for world demand for Brazilian soluble coffee 
Gls (all variables are first differenced)
dep. var.
qit
(a) one step (B) one-step robust (c) two step
qi(t-1) 0.1705 (0.0610)***    0.1705 (0.0263)***     0.1705 (0.0020)***   
qi(t-2) 0.1513 (0.0458)***     0.1513 (0.0687)**     0.1503 (0.00168)***   
pit -6.9780 (3.9958)*    -6.9780 (3.2496)**    -6.629508 (0.2745)***   
pi(t-1) 1.9161 (4.1644)     1.9162 (2.5819) 2.2146 (0.6217)*** 
fit -3.1718 (1.5645)**    -3.1718 (1.2900)*** -3.1535 (0.1190)***
fi(t-1) 0.7782 (1.8474)     0.7782 (1.7416) 0.7906 (0.0364)*** 
Rit 0.00015(0.000054)***     0.00015 (0.000073)*** 0.00015 (6.53e-06)***
Ri(t-1) 0.000016(5.4e-5)     0.000016(0.000063)* 0.000018(3.79e-06)*** 
xmst -0.013445 (0.0067)**   -0.01345 (0.0146) -0.0133 (0.00048)***
xms(t-1) 0.00858 (0.0226)     0.00858 (0.03533) 0.0098 (0.0016)***
jit -2.8260 (0.6562)***    -2.8260 (1.6277)* -2.8051 (0.04868)***
ji(t-1) 2.5881 (0.6546)***   2.5881 (1.4448)* 2.5994 (0.04363)***
Constant 8.4719 (8.5702)     8.4719 (10.9508) 7.9566 (1.4414)***
Number of obs 216 216 216
Sargan test
chi2(33)=202.12 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
–
chi2(33) =35.00 
Prob > chi2 = 0.3732
Wald test 154.01 1201.54 2.85e+07
A_B test  
autocovariance 
order 1 
z =-4.33
Pr>z = 0.0000
z =-1.48 
Pr > z = 0.1376
z =-1.28
Pr > z = 0.2016
A_B test  
autocovariance 
order 2 
z =0.48
Pr > z = 0.6294
z = 0.37
Pr > z = 0.7099
z = 0.25
Pr > z = 0.7989
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
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